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On the 31st December, 1912, approximately 160 of 
the Wankie coal miners 1,000 African mine workers 
came out on strike. The workers put two demands 
to the management which the latter rejected. The 
mine manager insisted that the workers be 
prosecuted for their refusal to work and by the 
3rd January, 1913, the workers had been prosecuted 
and had returned to work. the 4th January, the 
Wankie colliery was working 'normallyt. 
Until recently, the history of African labour in the premier industry 
of Rhodesia, mining, was compaxatively neglected. Since the publication of 
T. 0, Bangerrs African Voice, however, a number of studies have been made which 
offer new insights into black response in the indust;rial setting of Central 
Africa. (l) Such studies have contributed to a more sophisticated understanding 
of the processes of labour mobilization and pmletariaization in colonial 
economies. 
The broader based studies of scholars like Ranger and Arrighi have 
provided descria-tive backgrounds and conceptual approaches which are invaluable 
to the labotu: historian of Rhodesia. What are also requrired, however, are 
studies of a more detailed nature which examine the theoretical basis of Af'rican 
responses within the sociologically specific nexus of the mine compounds. A 
detailed exareination of the strike at the Wankie colliery in 1912 should assist 
in delineating some of the major determinants of African responses within the 
parameters of compound sociology and colonial industry. 
Opened in 1903 and situated in the isolated north-western area of 
Rhodesia, Wankie colliery occupied a position of central importance in the 
colony's economy. The availability of local coal not only ensured considerable 
savings in foreign exchange but it also facilitated the development of a railway 
system in an expansive territory. More fundamentally, however, the colliery 
yielded the fuel-power for the machinery of the major industry of the country - 
gold mining. The importance of gold and coal were inextricably linked in the 
economic system of the country: "Coal is as necessary as gold, because the 
absolute sine qua non of success in the latter industry is low working costs,"(2) 
Inexpensive coal from Wankie and cheap labour were two of the most important 
factors which ensured the continued profitability of gold mining in Rhodesia. 
The necessity of cheap coal for the gold mining industry ensured not 
only expanding production demands on the colliery but also consistent pressure 
for reductions in the price of coal. (3) Working within -the constraints of 
these economic realities the management at Wankie, in common with mining 
concerns throughout Rhodesia, pursued a policy of cheap black labour. This 
policy aimed at, and in large measure succeeded in, reducing a minimum direct 
expenditure on African labour in the form of wages =d inbirect expenditure on 
a diversity of items such as food, accommodation, hospitalization and 
compensation for injury. 
Procuring labour within the limitations of this policy was difficult, 
and in the first twenty years of the mine's existence the colliery suffered from 
periodic "labour shortages". .Thesefllabour shortagesw must have been compounded 
partly by the fact that the gold mines to the soutn of the colliery, in 
Matabeleland, paid hi&er wages. (4) This, coupled with a poor health record 
which, at least in part, stemmed from managerial indifference, did much to secure 
the mine a "bad namet1 during its opening years. In 1906, the native commissioner 
for the Sebungwe district noted of Wankie: "In the words of the Natives 
themselves the Colliery stinks' - Gu ya muka a Y~lahleni." (5) 
This unpopularity, which stemmed from an exploitative labour policy, 
meant that the colliery could not simply rely on a voluntary labour force which 
freely sought work at the mine. One of the first colliery managers made thin 
clear to his board of directors: "With regards to our requirements in Native 
labour, I am afraid that we will never get these fulfilled by voluntary natives, 
and consequently we must depend upon our agents, either Bureau or private, for 
our supply." (6) In order to operate with a full complement of cheap labour the 
Wankie managemen-t found it necessary to augment its working force with groups of 
Africans who, for various reasons, had little or no barmining power within the 
econoq. 
Workers procured from these latter groups were obtained in a variety of 
ways. lin. lgOj, for exmple, the management utilized the opportunity afforded by 
a serious drought to forward grain to an impoverished peasantry in exchange for 
underground labour. (7) Besides sporadic supplies of labour obtained in this way, 
the mine made extensive use of African workers supplied by the Rhodesian Native 
Labour Bureau. These workers, significantly called Chibaro (slave or forced 
labour) by their fellow workers, were dram from the poorest ranks of the 
peasantry, signed long-term contracts, and were "dmfted" to the most unpopular 
mines. (8) Besides IWLB workers, who had restricted bargaining powers, the 
management at different times also found it necessary to turn to the administration 
for assistance and make use of conviet labour - a group with no bargaining power 
at all. (9) 
The majority of the labour force at Wankie was not, however, composed 
of RNWB workers or convicts. (10) For the bulk of its labour supply the mine 
relied on its favourable geographical location and the absence of alternative 
labour markets in the north-west. The fact that there was no other mine within a 
200 mile radius ensured that at least some local T o w  and Tonka tribesmen would 
consider employment at Wankie. (11) Besides these local labourers, the mine was 
probably utilized to some extent by Africans working their way south to the more 
lucrative wages of Matabeleland and South Africa. In addition, Wankie, as a 
large cash employment centre in close proximity to Northern Rhodesia, a32d in 
particular Barotseland, must have held certain attractions for workers from those 
areas with tax and other obligations. 
It was largely gmups of workers drawn from these areas that had the 
earliest and most unfortunate experiences of conditions in the Wankie coapound. 
Despite these early experiences Africans were quick to reassess the  collie^ as 
a potential place of employment. In its opening year, 1903, the mine acquired 
a bad reputation, but by the end of the following year Africans were already 
reassessing it as a potential employment venue. (12) This process of reassessment 
persisted into the following year and was further facilitated by a dmp in the 
death rate at the mine. By the end of 1905 the of Mine Compounds for 
the W d i e  district could note that "There is no doubt that the mine has become 
more popular with native labourers". (13) 
From about mid-1905, however, one can detect the presence of two 
integrally related features which formed part of the recurrent labour crises at 
the colliery. Firstly, there was the consistent and increasing demand for coal 
for w e  in the gold mining industry, which in turn placed great pressure on the 
African work force to increase production. Production, especially during the 
early years, did increase rapidly. During 1906, fox example, the collfery' S coal 
output doubled. (14) These increases in production were not effected without 
cost to the black workers, and one sign of the pressure was the large number of 
assaults which manifested themselves at Wankie whenever an increase in output was 
expected. (15) 
This increased work pressure, when coupled with low expenditure on. food, 
combined to f o m  the second feature of the labour crises at the mine - a hi& 
sickness and death rate. (16) Ecequently these features would interact and 
foinforce one another to produce a spiralling effect which would culminate in a 
i & J o ~  crisis of some sort. Usually, the precipitating cause of such crises was 
an out,'ore& of scurvy. 
Given the profitability constraints of the mining industry as a whole 
in Rhodesia, it will readily be appreciated that scurvy was not restricted to 
WayLZrie. Between 1906 and 1908, for example, 4,046 black miners died in Rhodesian 
compounds from various diseases. Of these deaths, 8.3% in 1906, 12.7% in 1907, 
and 13.5% in 1908 were attributed to scurry. (17) Black mineworkers were dying 
from 
".., a disease of the blood, characterised by 
debility and anaemia, with sponginess and bleeding 
of the gums, bleedin$- into muscles, and effusions 
into joints and serious cavities, and in certain 
cases by superficial destruction of tissues and the 
formation of characteristic ulcers, especially on 
the lower limbs; it is caused by the absence of 
certain constituents found only in fresh food, and 
is aggravated and precipitated by unaccustomed 
muscular demand". (18) 
Fbom this description and the figures supplied, it is clear that the 
syndrome of hard work and inadequate diet was a basic feature of the Rhodesian 
mining inaustry. What is interesting and particularly noteworthy of Wankie is 
the marked way in which this pattern occurred at regular intervals during the 
first two decades of this centwry - 1908, 1910, 19x2 and 1918. What makes 1912 
special is that we can tsgce the development of this pattern in some detail, 
place it within the sociological setting of the compound, and link it to an 
active wo~ker response. 
Prior to 1912, outbreaks of scurvy at the colliery did not produce large 
scale united worker responses. African responses were, on the whole, defensive 
and based on individual or small group reaction. Thus, when the syndrome 
manifested itself in a relatively minor form in 1906, African workers skqly 
responded by deserting and making for the northern Rhodesian border. (19) It was 
perhaps the absence of such large scale worker response which enabled the 
management to undertake actions which facilitated later outbreaks of scurvy. 
During 1907, for example, no fresh vegetables at all were issued to black workers 
at Warrkie. This action was presumably due to the cost of fresh vegetables and the 
remoteness of the mine from fresh produce markets. (20) A further reduction in 
expenditure on African labour was achieved in l908 when the colliery, in comon 
with the rest of the mining industry in the country, implemented a general 
reduction in wages for black workers. (21) 
These actions, and especially the reduction in wages, contributed to 
subsequent outbreaks of scurvy. The reduction of wages would have reduced the 
mineworkers1 ability to puschase 19extratf food supplies from the store in the 
vicinity of the compound. Irm 1908 matters were com~licated by the fact that the 
rationing ~ystem was poorly organized. Anti-scorbutic rations such as meat m d  
vegetables were issued on only one day a week, and this meant, as a;n official 
enquiry later revealed, that ' l . . .  for five dq~s in the week the Nativest sole 
diet was Mealie Meal". (22) As usual, this dietary deficiency was accompanied by 
production pressure, and it was reported that many Africans wanted to leave 
"because the work was too hard". (23) 
Under these circumstances the mine rapidly lost its ability to attract 
local labour and the manager had to ffimport" labour - 84 "boys9' being obtained 
from Kimberley. With local labour avoiding the colliery to such a marked extent, 
it was further necessary to make use of labour obtained from the BKLB. These 
sceasures partly relieved the pressures in l908 but, since the underlying 
profitability constraints remained the same, it was inevitable that the pattern 
should repeat itself, and it did so in the following year. 
By the end of 1909 there had been at least 48 serious cases of scurvy 
at W i e  a;nd a number of deaths amongst black mineworkers. Again, the workers' 
response was largely defensive, and this is well illustrated in a letter which 
four Q"asasff sent to their headman in the Ncheu district of Nyasaland. 
"... we ourselves do not know that we shall arrive 
there [home] because we are all sick, here is bad 
disease, perhaps you shall see us but we do not 
h o w  because man;y people axe wing. We asked the 
Europeans to send us home and they refused and 
because the only way is by steamer [railwd we 
are not able to run away; whenever we try to run 
away the policemen catch us on the bridges because 
there is not another way we can go, they tell us 
to finish our work first, you cannot go before your 
work is finished, this is the reason we axe troubled 
here." (24) 
The desire to desert, its cause and the difficulties imposed by the Zambeai for 
workers wanting to leave Wankie are only too apparent from this note. 
As in 1908, these events at the colliery did not escape the attention 
of the administration. But, as was frequently the case, administrative action 
was not only belated but inadequate. Ehergency rationing and the order to build 
a new hopsital might relieve immediate pressure on the work force and increase 
its comfort, but it would not remove the underlying causes of such outbreaks. 
What was required was an increase in the workers' income, either directly in the 
forin of cash wages or indirectly by a long term improvement in the quality of the 
diet at the colliery. (25) Basically, many of the black mineworkers at Wanlsie, 
in common with black miners throughout Rhodesia, were '"iiving"on sub-subsistence 
wages. 
The tenuous position of black mineworkers flowed as a direct 
conseq,uence of the profitability constraints of the mining industry and the class 
position of these workers in a colonial political econorny. Perceived as 
llmigrantsgl - single males who worked for limited periods to supplement rmral 
income - white industrialists did not see these Africans as workers entitled to 
wages which would support faailies. The low wages paid in accordance with this 
perception were further justified by capitalists by pointing to food a;nd 
accommodation as a major part of real income. 
At Wankie, as at other mines in Rhodesia, there was some social reality 
at the base of this perception. It is certain that there were some single 
workers who saw their employment period as a temporary sojourn in order to earn 
necessary cash. It is also beyond doubt that cash wages were a suppiernent to 
m a l  income for many workers and, of come, Africans did receive food and 
accommodation. But the presence of some of these features in no way justifies 
tks stpggestion that it was of equal application to g black workers. To 
postdate and accep-t the existence of a homogeneous group of black mineworkers 
who shared all these features is to accept mining house ideology at face value. 
The justification for low wages found in managerial ideology simply 
did not s q w e  with the realities of compound life at WFrJayLkia, and other Rhodesian 
mines. In practice, a considerable number of Wankie workers were loneterm 
residents with families, and were permanent inhabitants of maqxied quarters in the 
compound. For many of these families the possibility of a rural income must have 
seemed remote. In any case normal seasonal fluctuations were such that few 
workers could rely on rural income as a "givenll year after year. In addition, 
many mineworkers, marrie6 and single, had to make considerable cash outlws on 
food and accommodation. At Wank'ie married men, and single workers who were 
anxious to escape the lack of privacy in the barracks-like central compound, 
often purchased huts in the compound from departing workers. (26) 
More particularly, however, Wankie workers, like workers throughout 
Rhodesia, were forced to invest a substantial part of their cash income in the 
purchase of "extraf1 food supplies. These "extra1' items of food, purchased at the 
m'ae store, were not, as management termed them, "luxuries", but an essential 
investment without which workers would not retain their health. (27) But the 
basic and real need for food also transcended the mere purchase of llextrasll, and 
workers spesit a substantial part of their free time in scouring the countryside 
for wild vegetables, fishing and hunting. (28) Especially in regard to the latter 
activities it is clear that, in a very real and specific sense, Wankie workers 
were dependent on the capacity of the local environment and seasonal variations 
for their state of health. The workers' welfare depended as much on weather as it 
did on wages. 
In the years when rainfall was adequate workers would supplement their 
mine rations in the way indicated, and by so doing would retain their health and 
productivity. But wages were so low and the quality of food rations so 
inadequate that even in the best of years only a tenuous balance was maintained. 
In such llnormalll years, however, access to the food resources of the S U I T O U ~ ~ ~  
countryside must have held scurvy outbreaks at bay a d  blunted potential worker 
responses. Management, however, could not always rely on the weather, and it was 
perhaps inevitable that in one year poor diet and production demds would 
coincide with a drought. In such a year the countryside could not be expected to 
yield that essential produce which alleviated the plight of the mineworkers. 
1912 was such a year. As the annual Report on tk;e Public Health later 
recorded, l. the evil effects on the mortality rates of a f&ne year were 
particularly marked in the case of native mine labourers". (30) Of no mine was 
this more true and at no mine were the consequences more dramatic than at Wankie. 
As from October 1912 food, both in terns of quantity and quality, 
became a serious problem at the colliery. From the start of that month E.O fresh 
vegetables at all were issued to compound inhabitants. With the exception of 
some onions that were issued d m h g  December, this situation persisted until the 
-time of the strike. To all intents and purposes the sole diet of black mineworkers 
became mealie meal. (31) Under the prevailing famine conditions food became of 
central importance not only to Wankie workers but also to the peasants in the 
smounding countryside. Lndeed, so scarce was food that the normal pattern was 
reversed m d  instead of food flowing from countryside to compound it frequently 
happened that miners were forced to take food to adjacent villages. (32) As in 
1.9039 the collie~j management utilized the opportunity afforded by the dsougkt to 
fomard grain to the peasants in exchange for labour contracts at the mine. (33) 
The food shortage in the compound soon manifested itself in the form of 
scurvy, and in October 7 cases of the disease were reported. As an increasing 
n . e r  of workers reported ill with the disease, so work pressure intensified on 
the remaining "healthy1' workers. The harder these latter workers worked on the 
inadequate diet the sooner they too developed scurvy, and by December, the month 
in which the strike occurred, there were 29 scurvy cases in the compound and 5 
deaths from the disease. 
The increase in scurvy cases and the number of deaths clearly left its 
impact on the productivity of the black mineworkers. In October each labourer 
produced 2.6 tons of coal during the month, by November it had dropped to 2.4, 
m d  by December it had been reduced to 2.2. This increase in sickness and the 
decline in productivity is evidence of the operation of a vicious circle. 
Inadequate food rations resulted in a growing sickness and death list, the 
increased sick and death rate placed an added production burden on the remainder 
of thetlhealthysl workers, and this added production burden, when coupled with the 
poor food, produced more scurvy. As this process entrenched itself, so the 
productivity of the workers declined. The basic dimensions involved are evident 
in the foliowing table. 
Month Output of coal per worker Scurvy cases per P r;c-&-tkis 





* all attributable to scurvy 
While food, health and production demands constitute the major features 
of the December strike, it would be unprofitable to allow an aaalysis to rest 
solely on tkis meu~istic foundation. Worker responses occur within a 
sociological nexus, and in order to understand worker demands and behaviour it is 
necessary to place these features within the setting of the compound. 
On the 15th November, the regular compound manager at the colliery, 
H. P. Marriott, left the mine on extended leave for a period of six months. 
Namiott had occupied the position for some years, and he was replaced by an 
acting compound manager, Roy. Roy obviously had little experience in a position 
bilxich was, in many respects, central to the smooth functioning of the compound. 
This lack of experience must have been apparent to some of those around Roy. O n  
assuming the job Roy was spoken to by T. R. Jackson, the acting native 
comi8sioner at Wankie. Jackson offered his support and pointed out to Boy that 
"... he and I were in a position to help each other enforce respect for all 
authority of the white man, whether of Government or employersft. (34) 
Prom subsequent events it is also clear that Boy felt that his duty to 
uphold ftthe authority of the white manrt was central to his role as acting 
compound manager. Roy's task could not have been easy, for, in addition to having 
limited experience, he was req~red to act within a managerial setting where there 
were marked tensions between various senior colliery officials. In particular, 
there was considerable hostility between Hewetson, the mine medical officer, and 
the manager of the colliery, A. R. Thomson. In part, this conflict can be traced 
to Thomsonls belief that "nativew malingerers were fooling the doctor, thus 
extending the sick list and. limiting production. (35) Because of his inexperience 
and the pressures of production Roy could not remain neutral in this conflict. 
The acting compound manager thus "inherited" some of the conflict that existed 
between the medical officer and the colliery manager. 
In an exposed position as a newcomer and a temporary incumbent of the 
position of compound manager Roy decided to play it safe and side with Thomson, 
the most senior official at the colliery. It was T. R. Jackson who noted that 
?'It was in December that the Acting Compound Manager, now replaced, tried to play 
up to the management, which informed me that there was 'a tremendous mount of 
malingering going on8 and that fithe natives were duping the Doctor ri@t and 
left!. . (36) Roy thus attempted to resolve his personal predicanent by siding 
with Thomson against Hewetson. In practice, this meant attempting to reiluce the 
sick list to a minimum and by so doing make more black workers available to meet 
production demands. 
Liko compound managera throughout Rhodesia, however, Roy had to 
interact not only with a series of white officials but with a team of apecially 
selected black men who had special responsibilitg for the control and discipline 
of black miners - the so-called "compound policet1. (37) Within the relativcig 
closed community that constituted the compound these black men had considesabLe 
power and responsibility. In theory these powers were exercised under the close 
supervision of the compound manager. Roy, however, faced with a divided white 
managerial team and consistent pressure, was forced to place even greater trust 
in his black subordinates. 
These compound "policeu had a variety of duties which necessitated 
close and frequent interaction with the black miners, 3uties ranged from 
assisting the compound manager in administering whippings to black miners to 
supervising and organizing the issuing of rations. The latter practice in 
particular gave compound "policeqt considerable scope for abuse, and managers 
in Rhodesia were well aware of this. (38) k a situation where part of the 
rationalization for pwing low wages was Lne distribution of food, the practice 
of making compound "police" responsible for food issues was akin to making one 
worker responsible for the payment of an important part of another workerf~ 
income. This wac true in the best years in Rfiodesia, and the practice frequently 
aroused tensions in mine compounds. (39) In a year of drought, famine and scurvy, 
the tension inherent in the sitmtion must have sharpened considerably. 
From November 1912 onwards, then, there were two sets of forces 
operating at the colliery, both of which produced tensions and increased pressure 
on the black mineworkers. Firstly, there were those sets of policies w d  
practices which derived from the profitability constraints of the industry and 
the role of Wankie as the sole source of coal in Rhodesia. Secondly, there was 
that particular configuration of social forces which derived from the sociology 
of the compound and the roles of the individual actors in those circumstances. 
It is now necessary to turn and examine how these forces interaceed to 
precipitate a strike by part of the black labous force. 
Roy, working for and with Thomson, saw his role largely as one of 
ensuring discipline and supplying labour in the necessary amounts in order to 
keep up production. The ac-ting compound manager set about achieving this 
objective in two wws. In the first instance, he undertook at fairly regular 
intervals a series of brutal assaults on black workers. These assaults were 
undertaken in order to reduce "loafingt'. Workers1 evidence at the court case 
which followed the strike throws some light on the activities of Roy and his 
compound "policett. Kalima, stated in evidence : 
"Arida and I were both whipped by the Compound 
manager last fiiday. He whipped us with a 
sjambok in the compound office towards sunset. 
We lay down on our faces held by the wrists by 
Charlie and by the ankles by Simon - the 
compound police boy who issues ratians. I 
heard Arida getting whipped first, while I was 
still locked up in the qstocks' close by. 
After that I was whipped across the buttocks. 
I received fifty-six cuts. (40) 
These and other similar assaults Roy undertook to ensure what he considered to be 
discipline and keep up production. (41) 
At the subsequent court case where the workers were put on trial, black 
mineworkers proved to be remarkably tolerant of Royls actions and took cognizance 
of the fact that he was new to the job. (42) What disturbed them more, however, 
was the fact that these whippings were undertaken in an arbitrary fashion witkou-l 
any systematic enquiry. As some of the workers put it, "The Acting Compound 
ManaQ;er would whip a boy on the word of his native tpolice' without making any 
enquiry of the alleged culpritrf. (43) In this regard the strikers were of the 
opinion that the compound "police" had misled Roy as to previous practice in the 
compound. Whippings had long been part of appmved management policy at Wankie, 
and workers were objecting not to the practice itself but the procedure that was 
followed. (44) 
As far as the strikers were concernari, however, it was Royfs second set 
of actions that constituted the proverbial last straw that broke the canelts back. 
Roy, acting within his and Thomson~s belief that the hospital was a refuge for 
malingerers, decided to make the hospital less attractive for recovering workers. 
To this end he ordered that all hospitalized workers and out-patients should be 
placed on a half meat ration. (45) For a work force strained to the limits of its 
capacity and clamouring for food this must have constituted a highly provocative 
gestm. 
This action in itself wao considered insufficient to reduce the 
s'Analingering'f and the management took further action to deal with what it thought 
-to be the problem. Instructions were issued to the effect that out-patients at 
the hospital were to undertake vflight-dutylt. There is some doubt as to whom 
exactly this instmction should be attributed and what exactly the nature of the 
"siFgb%-duty" was. (46) What is known is that the "light-duty" was unpaid and 
5;ila.e partly it involved out-patients being set to work next to convicts in the 
constrzzotion of a tennis court. (47) Since Hewetson was also the president of 
the loc;al lawn tennis club, it is possible that the lflight-dutyfv involved would 
achieve both his and Roy's objectives for different reasons. In any event, the 
puttiag of the sick to unpaid work next to convicts was a singularly unpopular 
management decision. 
The work and rationing system at the hospital was not the only cause 
for p i e v w e  amongst the workers. The cut-back in rations at the hospital that 
was achieved with managerial sanction was also being achieved in an infoml way 
in the rest of the compound. Here, the role of the compound staff sknd "-policew 
was crucial. At the time of the strike this staff constituted some 20 workers - 
1 clerk, 4 cooks, 7 sweepers and 8 "police boys". The most important of these 
staff members as far as the strike was concerned were Charlie, the head "police 
boy", and Simon, the compound "policemanfi responsible for rationing. Further, 
it might be noted that none of these "police boys" were Lozi. 
Under the supervision of Charlie and Simon a system of rationing 
operated which substantially reduced the amount of meat which each worker received. 
As a concomitzlst, the ansount of food available to the compound staff and their 
friends increased. The compound "police" simply kept back large portions of the 
meat ration for their own use. This practice continued for some time after the 
strike aYLd it was noted by Stokes, the perceptive IWI;B inspector who visited the 
colliery in February 1913. Stokes pointed out that "The issue of foodstuffs is 
almost entirely left to certain native compound police. These police boys seem 
somewhat out of the control of the Acting Compound Manager". (48) He further 
noted that, of the 480 lbs of meat to be issued, the compound staff kept back no 
less than 96 lbs for their personal use, and he pertinently suggested i;mt lvas 
there is starvation in the district, meat is naturally a very marketable 
c~mmodity~~. (49) Stokes's observations simply confirmed what had been suspected 
earlier by others. There seeme little reason to doubt that these practices 
extended back to at least the time that Boy took over the management of the 
compound. (50) 
Besides keeping back large quantities of meat for their own benefit, 
the compound "police1' also made little effort to ensure that the remaining meat 
was fairly distributed amongst the workers. This, too, did not escape the notice 
of Stokes: "When the food is issued a gong is struck and there is a general 
scramble, but the weaker boys, and those not having friends with the Police being 
served last!" (51) For these reasons grievances about rationing were to be found 
not only amongst those at the hospital but also amongst the rest of the workers 
in the compound. 
It is clear, then, that Royls actions, the rationing system and the 
problem of "light-duty" would have made themselves felt through a wide cross- 
section of the compound. But it also seems clear that this impact was nore 
deeply felt by one group of workers in particular. 
To define exactly the composition of the workers who participated in 
the strike is difficult because of certain overlapping dimensions that are 
present. The two most prominent of these dimensions are the ethnic and the 
occ~lpational. There is no doubt that the majority of the strikers were drawn 
from a single ethnic group - the Lozi. Of those prosecuted for participation in 
the strike 45% were Lozi, 15% Tonka, and the remainder were drawn fzom at least 
six other ethnic groups spread throughout central Africa. (52) Witn such a 
large number of the strikers drawn from one group, it was perhaps inevitable that 
some observers would see the dispute as being tribally based. The magistrate 
certainly saw it as an important feature, for in his judgement he noted that: 
"The bulk of the accused form a strong contingent from a tribe living under their 
own King, whose influence extends to the borders of this District. They must be 
taught to respect the laws of the land they are living in and that in no 
circumstances would it be tolerated that they should take the law in their own 
hands." (53) Roy was also of the opinion that it was largely the "IW30tsi~~ that 
were at the base of the trouble. 
It is clear that there was an ethnic dimension to the strike a d  that 
Lozi workers were particularly prominent in the events at the colliery. But the 
second tlimension, the occupational, seems at least as important as the former. 
Thomson, called to the compound, at once "... noticed that a number of the more 
highly paid boys were among the mobf1. (54) In a later telegram to the Chief 
Native Conrmissiorrer, Thomson again made it clear that he was aware of a dimension 
other than the ethnic when he pointed out that many of the strikers were 
underground "boss boys". (55) 
Zn seeking unifying features anongst the strikers, it is probably 
necessary to consider a third strand besides those of ethnicity and occupation. 
Although the evidence is scanty, it is probable that the skikers included 
aaongsttheir number a proportion of peasants who were at work at the colliery in 
exchange for grain forwarded to them during the drought. (56) Wkile the overall 
composition of the labour force at the time is not known, this m a y  be a further 
factor which could account for the predominswce of local tribesmen amongst the 
strikers. Losi and Tonka workers between them formed 600/0 of the strikers 
prosecuted. This, too, would account for the large nmbers of relatively low 
paid Tonka and Lozi workers involved in the strike - starving peasmts would have 
had little choice in determining their wage rates. 
Etkrlicity, occupation and indebtedness are thus three of the features 
which can be isolated when studying the composition of the group of strikers. It 
seems unnecessaw, and, given the cmss-cutting nature of some of these features, 
unwise, to choose any one of these factors as the llcause" of the strike. 
Individually, each of the features had a unifying potential amongst some of the 
strikers. Debt might have produced a certain amount of solidarity amongst lower 
paid T&a and Lozi workers. A common language would have facilitated the speed 
and ease of comrmulication amongst the Lozi workers,a;nd perhaps they shared a 
particular grievance because of the absence of a Lozi compound "policeman". (57) 
But production pressures would have been particularly felt by underground "boss 
boys1' regardless of ethnic background, althou& there does seem to be some 
evidence to suggest that many of these were Lozi. 
All of these factors, however, must have come into operation as 
discontent in the compound mounted in the latter months of 1912. It was in 
December particularly that the discontent started to manifest itself more openly. 
It was during this month that the largest number of new scurvy cases appeared in 
tll9 compound and during the same month that Roy inflicted some of the most severe 
beatings on the workers. When the management organized an elaborate sports 
lneeting for the black mineworkers on Christmas W ,  it was noted that "the 
W o t s i  were conspicuous by their absence from the whole proceedings". (58) 
By the 30th December the workers were no longer content to manifest 
their discontent indirectly, and they requested that Roy arrange for them to Pave 
a neetjng with Thomson. On the following morning, the 31st December, the Lozi, 
together with the other workers, assembled in the compound, dressed in their 
"holiday clothes". This clearly indicated that the workers had discussed the 
matter during the night and had no intention of working that day until at least 
such tine as they had discussed their grievances with Thomson. (59) Assembled 
in the compound, they again repeated their request to see Thomson, and Roy 
responded by demanding that they choose one man to represent them. This request 
was promptly refused, the workers pointing out that they all wished to speak to 
the colliery manager. When Roy refused their request and attempted to send them 
off to work, the minerec pointedly refused and remained standing in the compound. 
At this stage Roy sent for Thomson. 
Thomsonls arrival did little to reduce tension. On his arrival he 
immediately noted that "the sick were among the work boys" and his first action 
was to separate the sick from the healthy. Re then ordered the sick "boys" to 
proceed to the hospital and the healthy to remain behind in the compound. This 
pmcedure,and its consequences,was exactly one of the grievances which the 
workers wished to discuss and, as the hospital party moved off, a shout from the 
"work boys" caused the sick to attempt to rejoin the healthy group. It was then 
that Thomson grasped one of the sick "boysvv and "flicked him about the face with 
a stick". (60) 
It was these "couple of light taps" (~homsonfs words) that settled 
matters. "A great shout immediately went up from the gang of work boys ..., they 
threw sticks and hats in the air and jumped about and went out of the inner 
compound shouting.ll (61) It was from that moment that the strike really commenoed, 
Only after these events were the workers given the opportunity to articulate 
their grievances - with little success. Three days later the colliery manager 
still had very little insight into the range of motivatiom for the strike. 
Requested to give the reasons for the strike, he cabled a reply to the chief 
native commissioner which reveals his limited insight and understanding: 
wNatives mainly Barotse underground boss and special boys struck work 31st Dec. 
grievance being that hospital convalescent patients were put on light duty. Real 
reason overfed exhuberaace. If (62) 
Thomson~s behaviour in the compound left the workers with no avenue for 
redress within the compound or colliery. With a "quiet and respectfulf1 bearing 
they made for the offices of the British South Africa Police at Wankie and 
attempted to spell out their grievances. No sooner had they arrived at the BSAP 
offices, however, than Thomson arrived. Presumably annoyed at having his 
authority ignored, Thomson was in an uncompromising mood and insisted that the 
officer in charge prosecute the workers for insubordination and refusal to work. 
The colliery manager then left and the workers at the police station 
were joined by Roy. The latter again ordered the miners to return to work, and 
they again ignored the request. The workers then sent two deputations to Roy, 
each of which made sigzificant requests. The first of these simply requested 
that the day be declared a holiday and that in exchange for granting this request 
the miners would return to work on the following day. Given the production 
demands and work load at Wanlrie and the state of health of the workers, this 
demand was understandable, but Roy rejected it out of hand. (63) The second 
deputation demanded that compound "policemen1' Charlie and Simon be discharged in 
cxcha;nge for a return to work. This request, too, was rejected by Roy. (64) 
This concluded all efforts at flnegotiationll, and at this point the police took 
over and char~d the workers in accordance with Thomson~s demand. 
By the 3rd January, l63 workers had appeared in court. Some of the 
lqcauaes*f o the strike at Wankie were only too apparent, but these were not 
considered mitigating factors by a magistrate who felt that "The Authority of the 
Management of a large industrial concern must be maintained even in the face of 
misma;nagementfl. (65) The court was further of the opinion that "there was ample 
machinery for them to secure the redress of grievances without any such displw" 
and proceed& to find 158 of the workers guilty. Most of the workers were fined 
the equivalent of one month's wages, and collectively the 158 workers paid a sum 
of £285.2.6. in fines. (66) By the 4th January Thomson could telegraph to the 
ckief native commissioner that I1natives got stiff fine for striking work. They 
are working todayg1. (67) The strike was over, aYld as far as the management was 
concernea the colliery was working lfnormallyll. 
The strike might have ended but the underlying grievances which had 
precipitated the troubles at the colliery persisted. January saw double the 
number of deaths from scurvy as compared with December, and by the end of the 
month ten workers had died from the disease. In February, at the time of the 
visit by the RNLI3 inspector, Stokes, it was noted that the same rationing was 
still in operation. During the same month the assistant medical director in the 
colony was still facing a refusal by the management to purchase fresh vegetables 
for black miners. (68) Narch saw twenty new cases of scurvy, and it was only 
towards the end of that month, when the rains fell, that the situation eased. (69) 
The workers had failed to modify the management's practices through industrial 
action, and it was left to nature to improve the lot of the Wankie miners. 
It is necessary now to set the experiences of the colliery workers in a 
broader context to assess the significance of the above events. W?at does the 
Wa,nl.de strike reveal about black mineworkers in Rhodesia m6 the functioning o l  
the conpouxxl s~rstem in a colonial political econow? To what extent were even-15 
at the colliery "typical1f of %he mining industry in Rhodesia? 
In at least two important respects the events at W d i e  were typical of 
the mining k~dustq in Rhodesia. Firstly, the events occurred within 
profitabiXi%y constraints that were c o m n  to the i;lieustry as a whole. There had 
been numerous scurvy outbreaks before this at W-ie, and while the profitability 
constraints remained similar other outbreaks could be expected to follow. Thus 
ia lg18, for example, the old syndrome of imdeguate diet aid production pressure 
again produced a labour crisis, At that time coal production declined so 
markedly that Cizaplin, the administrator, was forced to suggest to the directors 
of the company that the manager be "relieved from supervision of native labourqf. (70) 
Neither was scurvy restricted to Wa;nkie, for as late as 1936 there were still over 
600 cases of scur~vy reported amongst black rr;ineworkers tk~~ou&out t%e country. (73.) 
Secondly, events at the colliery were tnical in the sense that they 
wexe derived aYld precipitated fron the operation of forces which existed in large 
measure in compounds througT~out Rhodesia. At WanIrie and elsewhere, colqpound 
3~1,nagers frequently resorted to the use of the to inpose discipline, and 
 ore often thaa not -they were assisted in W s  by tbeil: compound "policeT1. (72) 
Likewise, compound "police" were often the s o m e  of friction and tension in l 
compounds because of their control of the rationing system. Further, the l 
coaflicts between the demands for pmduction anCb the restriction of expenditure, 
on Liw one w d  -the need to safeguard the  heal^ of the workers, on %he other 
Piaad, often gave rise to conflict between mine inedical officers nnd Ilz%nagers. (73) 
Thus7 in terns of both the parasueters of the problem andl precipitating "causes9q, 
events at the collieq were typical. There is no single aspect of the probarn at 
W&r&ie which was not present in some measure or other in "ce majority of Ehodesian 
mine coqounds. 
The regcllasity and severity of the labour crises at the colliery, 
however, suggest that in some respects at least the mine was not tygical. 'Phe 
collienj was different in that it had a lower wage structure for its black 
niners - an as;2ect which reflected on the fact that the mine was a coal aYid no-t a 
gold mine. Further, as the sole producer of a vital subsidkar~r industry in the 
coun-by, the nine was particularly sensitive to production demands. In addition, 
1912 was exceptional in that the length and severity of the drox&at left the 
workers par"cicular1y vulnerable and that difficulties at the mine were compounded 
'by problems of w e n t .  But the uniqueness of these aspects should not be 
allowed to overshdow the fact that most of the features at W d i e  were comon to 
the industry, and that qualitatively i.t was tyyical of the functioning of the 
mining h&-try as a whole. 
m i c a 1  or not, the colliery strike presents historians with further 
evidence about the nature and extent of worker consciousness amongst Africans on 
Rhodesian mines. (74) Although the largest number of participants in the strike 
wen? Lozi, workers from at least six other tribes associated themselves with the 
dispute. Farther, the nat;Ure of the d-ds made dming the strike (the aemad 
for a rest day and the request for the aischarg.ing of the compound "police's) is 
evidence of the ability of social forces derived from the conpound setting t o  
trmcend the more limited horizons of ethnicity and produce worker co-operation, 
Other demands made during the strike, however, reveal the essentially 
conservative nature of the response by black workers and the extent to which they 
had been psychologically colonized by settler power in state and industry. Prior 
to 1912, in other Rhodesian mines, workers had on occasion manifested aggressive 
responses in the face of industrial exploitation. (75) At Wankie, the workers' 
behaviour was "quiet and respectful", and Thomson, when asked to describe it, 
stated that "there was nothing sullen or threatening about it". (76) The 
workers9 demands were essentially conservative. They objected to the manner in 
which the rations were issued and the fact that Roy beat them on the word of his 
compound They objected to rationing not the rations, to procedure not 
punishment. Their demands were directed at the f'unctioning of the system not the 
questioning of it. 
Worker behaviour was so restrained and demands so conservative that the 
question is raised about the extent to which compounds colonized and moulded the 
personality of black workers. (77) Compounds certainly constitute an example of 
a very specific set of institutions which have a particular s~encompassing or total 
character". (78) As such, compounds have a capacity to control and regulate 
worker behaviour to an extent which is well in excess of the powers of lnost 
metropolitan industrialists. In many respects the conservative nature of the 
response at Wankie was the f o r e m e r  of later manifestations of extreme docility 
in the face of arbitrary violence in the industrial setting. (79) It seems 
;?ossible that in the majority of cases in Rhod.esia, -the combination of managerial 
power in the compounds and state power outside was sufficient to militate against 
Vne development of agg-ressive worker responses. 
The latter aspect draws attention to another feature which is typified 
in the Wamkie strike of 1912 - the co-operation between state and industry when 
com"ronted with black labour unrest. It will be remembered that the native 
comr~.i_ssloner (who was also the magistrate at ~ankie) told. Roy that they had 
something in common and that they were in a position to "help each other enforce 
respect for all authority of the white man, whether of Government of employerI1. 
The use of state power to break strikes and settle industrial disputes involving 
' black workers was an integ-ral part of the functioning of a colonial political 
econoay. A mere nine years later at WaYlkie, during another strike, police were 
used to escort workers back to the pit head. (80) The police also played an 
inportant past in breaking the fanous Shamva strike of 1927. (81) Collective 
bargaining in the colonial situation was not a privilege which could be extended 
to a subjected people who constituted the basis of a system of cheap labour. 
But perhaps most clearly of all the 1912 W d i e  strike demonstrates 
the vulnerable class position of black mineworkers in a colonial political 
economy. Unlike fully pmletarianized white workers with families, black workers 
were paid the wages of "single menqf, denied direct participation in the political 
system, and consistently crushed in their attempts at collective bargaining. 
Part of their income was derived from peasant farming, but so low were their 
wages in the mining industry a d  so taxing their work demarrds that workers had to 
supplement their diet from the local environment in order to retain their health. 
In short, their position was remote from that articulated in the managerial 
rhetoric of the d h y  or the qthology of some contemporary historiography which 
suggests that 
"After the initial period of frontier friction in 
the nineties, the Chartered Company established a 
better record in labour and health matters than 
any British, French or Portuguese Colony in Africa 
at the time. Mine work became more popular in 
Rhodesian villages, and native mine workers 
generally became better fed than their cousins 
in the kraals." (82) 
Workers at Wankie, like mineworkers throughout Rhodesia, were pwing the price for 
industrialization, and in the light of their and other workersf experiences it 
seems st- to suggest that "Tribal cohesion, the existence of large land 
resemres a;nd addnistrativo paternalism, all combined to act as a kind of shock 
absorber, protecting Africans against the worst effects of iacipient 
industrialisation". (83) 
Indirectly, this vulnerable class position and the exposed position of 
the workers was only too apparent, and acknowledged by some of the mine management 
at Wanlrie. Instead of seeing the strike as being derived from the position of 
black workers in the colonial economy, however, they saw it as being rooted in 
the vagaries of weather and drew more modest conclusions: "It is perhaps rather 
too soon yet to gather up the lessons in detail, but one thing is abundantly 
clear, namely that the seasons vary considerably and that consequently we must be 
prepared for these bad seasons at a.ny time. In more ways than one we are clearly 
dependent on the weather, a thing which however cannot be forecast with any degree 
of certainty. 'l (84) 
In term8 of the analysis suggested above, however, it seems clear that 
the Wankie strike of 1912 can be attributed to profitability constraints of the 
i&ktstry, the vulnerable position of the workers in a colonial political economy, 
the parbicular constraints operating within the compound setting, and the fact 
"that Ynese features happened to coincide with a year of severe drought in 
Ehodesia. Drought might have been the catalyst, but ft certainly was not the 
cause of the strike. 
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